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A.) AIR WING F-8 STRIKE TACTICS
The F-8 was used as a fighter and as a bomber. The primary mission however, was assigned to air superiority and daily mission scheduling reflected this priority. Attack missions were assigned only after all fighter commitments had been met. The order for priority of mission assignment was as follows:
1.) COMBAT
a.) BARCAP & Condition CAP
b.) TARCAP, MiGCAP, and FORCE CAP.
c.) Armed weather recce and point target bombing.
2.) COMBAT SUPPORT
a.) Photo escort.
b.) Logistics.
B.) AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION FOR MISSIONS ASSIGNED ARE STATED BELOW:
MISSION ORDNANCE
1.) Day TARCAP, BAR- 2 AIM-9D
CAP, MiGCAP, FORCE‑
CAP PHOTO ESCORT.
2.) Night FORCECAP, 1 AIM-9D
BARCAP, MiGCAP. 1 AIM-9C
3.) Armed Recce/Coastal 4 LAU-10 Recce (download to two 4 MK-82
LAU-10 when wind over
deck is 30 kis or less)
4.) Weather Recce Night 2 AIM-9D Day forecast good weather 2 LAU-10 Day forecast bad weather 2/4 AIM-9D
5.) Strike. 4 MK-82
6 MK-81 2 MK-83
6.) Flak Suppression
4 LAU-10 6 MK-81 4 MK-117 4 MK-82
A VF-211 F-8E is being positioned on the starboard catapult of the USS Hancock (CVA-19) prior to an armed recce mission. 4 LAU-10 Zuni launchers are loaded on the"Y"fuselage racks.(USN)
C.) FIGHTER TACTICS
The basic loose deuce formation stressing section integrity was used for all fighter roles. Squadron flight schedules reflected the practice of flying "teams" on all hops. The squadron tactical organization was utilized and rare exceptions were noted wherein individual sections were split to facili
ate scheduling. The armament configuration as reflected above was used almost exclusively. Great emphasis was placed on ground and flight checking of the missile and gun system. A missile maximum detection range test was completed on all hops and records maintained on each aircraft to reflect the status of the missile and aircraft armament system. Aircraft guns were fired out on a scheduled basis and preventive maintenance conducted to keep them in good order. The APO-94 reliability was high and routine BARCAP/FORCECAP Tactics were predicated on its utilization.
1.) SPECIFIC FIGHTER TACTICS. Every attempt was made to utilize standard doctrine. Daylight operations stressed visual lookout and night operations stressed the utilization of the radar and mutual protection measures.
a.) TARCAP, Fighter aircraft were assigned to • accompany all strikes which proceeded North of 18°40'N during daylight hours. The TARCAP rendezvoused with the strike group normally at Hon Mat Island at an altitude of 14-18,000 feet and proceeded with the strike group to the target, maintaining close escort throughout the ingress and egress phase of the strike. Standard operating procedure provided for elements of the strike group to separate and conduct recon of prescribed highway/waterway segments after completing initial strikes against Traffic Control Points (TCP). TARCAP was provided for all elements operating North of 18040'N specifically providing protection against "pop up" enemy aircraft operating in the same general locale. Upon completion of initial TARCAP assignment and after all strike aircraft were feet wet, the fighters joined the Iron Hand and RESCAP attack aircraft and provided close escort during their recce phase or established a barrier in the general locale of recce operations. Since CVW-5 was assigned the Northern Traffic Control Area (TCA) this TARCAP barrier was generally oriented roughly parallel to 19°N and flown between the coast at Phu Dien Chau (19°N) and the Song Ca north- west of Vinh Son (18°57'N/105-55E). The barrier concept was also employed when hard targets were not assigned to the strike aircraft and several sections were conducting recce missions over various routes and a single F-8 section was unable to provide close escort for all strike aircraft.
After all aircraft were feet wet TARCAP rendezvoused with assigned tanker aircraft (usually the EKA-3B assigned the dual role of ECM/tanker, otherwise a KA-4), refueled to a mlnumum of 4500 lbs. and checked in with the MiGCAP control ship for assignment as MiGCAP.
b.) BARCAP.
1.) Mission. The mission of the BARCAP is the protection of all friendly forces over the Gulf of Tonkin. Red Crown was the primary control ship for BARCAP on UHF button 14, frequency 281.9 MHZ. Station assignment subsequent to the termination of bombing North of 190 N is 050 radial 20-60 miles from TACAN channel 26 located on the PIRAZ ship at 19°37'N 106°47'E. BARCAP's were never assigned additional missions, were normally kept feet wet, and were not to be used for intercepts of MiG's that did not threaten surface forces or support aircraft over the Gulf of Tonkin.
Occasionally the BARCAP station was expanded so that special mission Air Force flights (in particular COMBAT APPLE) were provided close escort at the northeastern extremity of their tracks. This placed the BARCAP up to 110 miles on the 065 radial of channel 26.
2.) PROCEDURES. BARCAP were launched first and recovered last due to the nature of their mission. An expeditious rendezvous was required regardless of weather conditions in order to effect an early on-station relief. Rules required that the relieving CAP must be North ol9 9 15'N, under radar control and positive radio communication with Red Crown before the on-station section could proceed toward homeplate. When relief was effected, the off-going section returned to homeprate as expeditiously as possible using section random
radar letdown if the weather did not allow for Case I recovery.
Tanking was provided for all BARCAP hops. Normally, one KA-4 was provided and 1500 lbs. of fuel was given to each fighter midway through the cycle. Bingo fuel states were considered when tanking was not available or an undue delay was experienced in on-station relief.
Section loose deuce formation was used exclusively during daylight VFR conditions. Night or IFR formations were normally 4-5 mile radar trail, or close tactical wing if the radar was inoperative. Radio discipline was continuously monitored to eliminate the divulgence of important tactical information to enemy electronic systems. Fuel states and steer times were always given using the base altitude code of the day. Information concerning the status of weapons system, missile system or gun system was relayed either by hand signals or by KY-28 cipher.
The BARCAP was occasionally double cycled to maintain constant coverage on station. In order to achieve realistic utilization of the BARCAP under these situations, a minimum of 5000 lbs. of fuel per F-8 was required. In all cases, but particularly at night, stringent fuel management was observed with trade-off between maximum endurance and high performance. An average fuel flow of 3000 pounds per hour (PPH) while on-station provided the compromise. It was policy to always completely fill aircraft with liquid oxygen for each launch, thus being ready for a double cycle.
BARCAP flying, by its nature, is hours and hours of pure boredom interspersed with moments of sheer exhilaration or terror. Pilots were continually reminded not to get complacent during the hours of boredom or careless during the exhilaration phase as Ho's boys were constantly figuring out ways to bag you.
C.) FORCECAP. The mission of FORCECAP was similar to BARCAP except the assigned control ship varied each day. Each carrier was assigned daily FORCECAP missions and information concerning the controlling unit. Whenever possible, FORCECAP hops were utilized to train GCI controllers and keep pilots current on Al techniques and terminology. Night FOPCECAP commitments were utilized to best advantage in the training of controllers and in pilot refresher hops.
d.) MiGCAP.One section of fighters was assigned as MiGCAP during any cycle when strike aircraft were operating north of 18°40'N. The MiGCAP would be placed under the control of the strike support ship (SSS). They would hold "feet wet" at an altitude of 20-25,000 and maintain a barrier patrol oriented along the coastline adjacent to the operating area. When the MiG threat developed and MiGs had penetrated south of
19°N, the MiGCAP would be vectored immediately toward a position to engage. Whenever there was a second section of fighters available, they would be vectored into a 3-4 mile trail position on the lead aircraft.
TACTICS. The loose deuce section was used exclusively and all available fighters were vectored in pairs toward the engagement area. Run-in altitudes were kept as low as possible, 1000-1500 feet, to remain below the enemy radar screen. Run-in speed was maintained between 550-600 kts. When engaged, maximum lookout doctrine was required as anytime there were MiGs at twelve o'clock there were also MiGs at six o'clock. The AIM-9D missile performed approximately 60% satisfactorily when it was fired "in envelope". Continued stress was placed on knowing the envelope of the missile and setting up the shooting situation correctly in order to get a kill. Maximum use was made of the VHF jamming capabilities of the EA-6A and the EKA-3I3 from a position just off the beach.
The fighter pilots aggressively went after the MiGs avoiding any known SAM or flak trap enroute. The most successful attacks were high speed slashing attacks keeping speed high and at all times maintaining the criteria for offensive maneuvering.
CONTROL PROCEDURES. The environment which surrounds the U.S. fighter pilot, i.e., over enemy territory, vectored against a superior enemy GCI system, SAM, and AAA threat, and an equally aggressive enemy fighter pilot, requires the ultimate coordination between the controller and the pilot. CAP aircraft must be given positive vectors to intercept the MiGs. The controller must assume aggressive, positive control and must
endeavor to give a good set-up on the MiGs, specifically, put our CAP between 3 and 9 o'clock 1-3 miles aft of the MiGs. In order to prosecute the intercept with as little penetration as possible into the area of operations for our strike aircraft, the fighter must necessarily be vectored toward the enemy aircraft. However, to reduce the probability of allowing a second enemy fighter section to be vectored to the six o'clock position of friendly fighters and to enhance our capability of cutting the enemy off from sure retreat to the north of 19°, the intercept vector was delayed until such action will make these eventualities more certain. A second MiGCAP section under a separate controller could be used to guard the six o'clock of the first MiGCAP section by trailing at approximately five miles. Experience showed that controllers had difficulty in holding a second MiGCAP section in this optimum position and that usually the vector to intercept presented friendly fighters at the twelve o'clock of at least one section of enemy fighters even though the lead section of friendly fighters was able to gain an immediate offensive. The MiGs and their controllers appeared to aim for this sandwiching tactic, knowing that they were favorably set up for it with a sanctuary to the north which effectively reduced the area of friendly tighter operations by one half.
The necessity for continuing the intercept vector to engagement with‑out regard to "boundaries", rather than making an initial thrust toward the enemy aircraft and turning away cannot be overemphasized. A "break-off" turn at distances less than eighteen mileswill prove fatal to the friendly fighters. Close liaison with the controlling ship (SSS) was maintained throughprebriefed tactics and extensive de‑briefs of the engagements. Thisliaison and the subsequent under‑standing of the problems associated with fighter engagements as regardsfuel and tanking requirements, clear‑ing six o'clock and positioning F-8fighters for visual acquisition were meaningful in attempting to prosecute desired tactics. This liaison empha‑sized the importance of feeding allknown information regarding banditsfrom any source to engaging fighters. Superiority of numbers was notachieved by the combination of KG175 and 21s at any time. On several occasions sections of MiGs were held on friendly radars trailing egressing F-8s. Whenever possible, additional fresh fighters with sufficient fuel and armament should be positioned to provide cover for disengaging fighters who will be low on fuel and ammunition. Tankers were held as close as possible to the beach and vectored toward spent fighters to expedite fueling.
e.) PHOTO ESCORT. The mission was performed using a fighter configured aircraft as escort to the RF-8G. Typical profile of the mission was a climb to 15,000' to 20,000', rendezvous, and then proceed to the coast-in point using the mapping scale of the APO-94 for accurate positioning in event of bad weather. Most missions were flown between 5,000 and 6,000 feet with the F-8 flying a loose deuce position. It is important to emphasize staying away from the trail position on the RF-BG as any under-lead by enemy gunners would put the escort in the line of fire. The escort is assigned the responsibility of calling all flak, SAM's, and break turns as the photo pilot is normally occupied with navigation and photography. Since most photographic runs were made at 500 to 600 kts., the escort often required tanking upon going feet wet. A typical profile would require tanking of 1,000 to 1,500 lbs. in order to meet a 1+30 time cycle. The primary mission of the escort in countering an air threat is defensive in nature and the fighter must remain with the photo Crusader unless he is required to separate in order to prevent attack.
f.) ARMED RECCE/WEATHER RECCE. All armed/weather recce flights were conducted on an "as needed" basis. CTF-77 established the basic weather recce requirements for each carrier and these flights were assigned to the fighter squadrons. The aircraft were configured to carry either 2 LAU-10 or 4 MK-82 so as to perform an effective armed coastal recce mission while satisfying the requirements of weather reporting. Specific requirements for weather reporting were assigned by Strike Center prior to launch. The pilot was normally required to relay the weather back to the ship at the earliest opportunity and, in addition, be prepared to make recom
mendations on the execution of strike flights into his assigned area of responsibility. Ordnance was expended on assigned point targets or targets of opportunity. With the advent of good weather in the target areas, Weather Recce missions were combined with TARCAP missions in fighter configured aircraft. Weather information and recommendations were passed back to the force either prior to or following escort of strike aircraft on their
mission.
e.) IRONHAND ESCORT. The practice of escorting Ironhand configured A-4s with F-8 fighters was utilized to release more A-4 aircraft for primary strike missions when the requirements existed. This provided additional Visual look out protection to
VF-24 F-8J (updated F-8E) drops MK-83
bombs in April 1972. (USN via B. Miller)
the pouncer aircraft and provided fighter cover when conducting pouncer missions in a MiG threat area. The responsibilities on the F-8 escort were to provide additional electronic protection to the Ironhand aircraft by continuously maintaining the two plane ALFA formation. The fighter escort assumed the leader was always "on the gages" and called out all flak, SAMs, MiGs and even friendly aircraft that posed a threat to the section. Should an engagement with enemy aircraft become inevitable, the Iron-hand leader would pass the lead to the F-8 fighter escort. The fighter would maneuver to defeat the attack as soon as possible and then resume the primary mission of providing cover for the SAM suppressor. The tactical maneuvering performed by the F-8 must stress defense against the MiG threat as the F-8/A-4 were not compatible to offensive tactical maneuvering. Of primary importance, however, is that the strike force will be without needed protection until the pouncer section can reassume its primary mission of SAM suppression.
h.) BOMBER ROLE. The basic delivery techniques for the F-8 strike aircraft was a 45° dive angle with a 5,000 foot AGL release. F-8 bombers were utilized in South Vietnam or Laos under FAC control. At the onset of good weather in the North, the F-8s were assigned point targets in areas of responsibility after meeting all other commitments. When the active MiG threat South of 20° N commenced all F-8 assets were utilized in the fighter role.
D.) NORTH VIETNAMESE MIG TACTICS
During the month of May and June, the tactical employment of the NVN air defense system settled down into somewhat of a predictable pattern. When the MiG-17/21s were launched out of Bai Thuong, the composition was normally 2 MiG-17s and 2 MiG-21s. The MiG-17s proceeded south toward 19°N at an airspeed of .5 IMN and a altitude of 6-8,000 feet. The MiG-21s proceeded west to the border of NVN and Laos and then south to a holding point located generally at 19°08'N/104°50'E. From this initial positioning, the MiG-17 penetrated 19°N heading generally 160-180 at 6-8,000 feet and about 550 kts. IAS. The MiG-21s would leave their holding point and proceed southwest at low altitude to the general area of Vinh Son. The scheme apparently was to close control the MiG-17 toward any friendly aircraft in the area to engage and to be bait for the low section of MiG-21s. The attack technique used by the MiG-21 was to gain a position below and behind the friendly aircraft. From this attack position, the MiG-21 s would execute one missile firing pass, disengage and use their airspeed and
performance to zoom up out of range and proceed back north of 19°N.
The MiG-17 seemed more willing to stay and fight. They were normally configured with drop tanks, and no missiles, and attacked with their cannon. A MiG-17 engagement was characterized by a high speed low altitude, turning fight utilizing afterburner to the maximum by both F-8s and MiGs. The MiG pilots seemed aggressive, but were reluctant to utilize their aircraft to its full advantage or to enter into vertical maneuvers.
the pouncer aircraft and provided fighter cover when conducting pouncer missions in a MiG threat area. The responsibilities on the F-8 escort were to provide additional electronic protection to the Ironhand aircraft by continuously maintaining the two plane ALFA formation. The fighter escort assumed the leader was always "on the gages" and called out all flak, SAMs, MiGs and even friendly aircraft that posed a threat to the section. Should an engagement with enemy aircraft become inevitable, the Iron-hand leader would pass the lead to the F-8 fighter escort. The fighter would maneuver to defeat the attack as soon as possible and then resume the primary mission of providing cover for the SAM suppressor. The tactical maneuvering performed by the F-8 must stress defense against the MiG threat as the F-8/A-4 were not compatible to offensive tactical maneuvering. Of primary importance, however, is that the strike force will be without needed protection until the pouncer section can reassume its primary mission of SAM suppression.
h.) BOMBER ROLE. The basic delivery techniques for the F-8 strike aircraft was a 45° dive angle with a 5,000 foot AGL release. F-8 bombers were utilized in South Vietnam or Laos under FAC control. At the onset of good weather in the North, the F-8s were assigned point targets in areas of responsibility after meeting all other commitments. When the active MiG threat South of 20° N commenced all F-8 assets were utilized in the fighter role.
D.) NORTH VIETNAMESE MIG TACTICS
During the month of May and June, the tactical employment of the NVN air defense system settled down into somewhat of a predictable pattern. When the MiG-17/21s were launched out of Bai Thuong, the composition was normally 2 MiG-17s and 2 MiG-21s. The MiG-17s proceeded south toward 19°N at an airspeed of .5 IMN and a altitude of 6-8,000 feet. The MiG-21s proceeded west to the border of NVN and Laos and then south to a holding point located generally at 19°08'N/104°50'E. From this initial po‑
sitioning, the MiG-17 penetrated 19°N heading generally 160-180 at 6-8,000 feet and about 550 kts. IAS. The MiG-21s would leave their holding point and proceed southwest at low altitude to the general area of Vinh Son. The scheme apparently was to close control the MiG-17 toward any friendly aircraft in the area to engage and to be bait for the low section of MiG-21s. The attack technique used by the MiG-21 was to gain a position below and behind the friendly aircraft. From this attack position, the MiG-21 s would execute one missile firing pass, disengage and use their airspeed and performance to zoom up out of range and proceed back north of 19°N.
The MiG-17 seemed more willing to stay and fight. They were normally configured with drop tanks, and no missiles, and attacked with their cannon. A MiG-17 engagement was characterized by a high speed low altitude, turning fight utilizing afterburner to the maximum by both F-8s and MiGs. The MiG pilots 
seemed aggressive, but were reluctant to utilize their aircraft to its full advantage or to enter into vertical maneuvers.
VF-211 updated F-8E, flying sur‑
veillance over a Chinese Communist Hung Chi class merchant ship. (USN)
| F-8 VIETNAM DATA |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| VIETNAM F-8 |
|
| FIGHTER SQUADRON CARRIER DEPLOYMENTS |
|
|
|
|
|
| CVV/-2 |
|
|
|
| CVW-19 |
|
|
|
|
| 03-06-65 to 11-23-65 | VF-111 | F-8D | 4XX/NE | MIDWAY | 01-28-64 to 11-21-64 | VF-191 | F-8E | 1XX/NM | BON HOMME RICHARD |
| CVW-5 |
|
|
|
|
| VF-194 | F-8C | 2XX/NM |
|
| 04-14-64 to 12-15-64 | VF-51 | F 8E | 1XX/NF | TICONDEROGA | 04-21-65 to 01-13-66 | VF-191 | F-8E | 1XX/NM | BON HOMME RICHARD |
|
| VF-53 | F-8E | 2XX/NF |
|
| VF-194 | F-8E | 2XX/NM |
|
| 09-28-S5 to 05-13-66 | VF-51 | F-8E | 1XX/NF | TICONDEROGA | 10-15-66 to 05-29-67 | VF-191 | F-8E | 1XX/NM | TICONDEROGA |
|
| VF-53 | F-8E | 2XX/NF |
|
| VF-194 | F-8E | 2XX/NM |
|
| 01-05-67 to 07-22-67 | VF-51 | F-8E | 1XX/NF | HANCOCK | 12-27-67 to 08-17-68 | VF-191 | F-8E | 1XX/NM | TICONDEROGA |
|
| VF-53 | F-8E | 2XX/NF |
|
| VF-194 | F-8E | 2XX/NM |
|
| 01-27-68 to 10-10-68 | VF-51 | F-8H | 1XX/NF | BON HOMME RICHARD | 04-16-6910 11-17-69 | VF-191 | F-8J | 1XX/NM | ORISKANY |
|
| VF-53 | F-8E | 2XX/NF |
|
| VF-194 | F-8J | 2XX/NM |
|
| 03-18-69 to 10-29-69 | VF-51 | F-8J | 1XX/NF | BON HOMME RICHARD | 05-14-7010 12-10-70 | VF-191 | F-8J | 1XX/NM | ORISKANY |
|
| VF-53 | F-8J | 2XX/NF |
|
| VF-194 | F-8J | 2XX/NM |
|
| 04-02-70 to 11-12-70 | VF-51 | F-8J | 1XX/NF | BON HOMME RICHARD | 05-14-71 to 12-18-71 | VF-191 | F-8J | 1XX/NM | ORISKANY |
|
| VF-53 | F-8J | 2XX/NF |
|
| VF-194 | F-8J | 2XX/NM |
|
| CVW-8 |
|
|
|
| 06-05-72 to 03-30-73 | VF-191 | F-8J | 1XX/NM | ORISKANY |
| 03-05-70 to 12-17-70 | VF-111 VF-162 | F-8H F-8H | 1XX/AJ 2XX/AJ | SHANGRI-LA | CVW-21 | VF-194 | F-8J | 2XX>NM |
|
| CVW-10 |
|
|
|
| 10-21-64 to 05-29-65 | VF-24 | F-8C | 4xx;np | HANCOCK |
| 05-11-67 to 12-30-67 | VF-111 | F-8C | 1XX/AK | INTREPID |
| VF-211 | F-8E | 1XX/NP |
|
|
| DET 11 |
|
|
| 11-10-65 to 08-01-65 | VF-24 | F-8C | 4XX>NP | HANCOCK |
| 06-04-68 to 02-08-69 | VF-111 | F-8C | 1XX/AK | INTREPID |
| VF-211 | F-8E | ixx;np |
|
|
| DET 11 |
|
|
| 01-26-67 to 08-25 67 | VF-24 | F-8C | 4XX>NP | BON HOMME RICHARD |
| CVW-15 |
|
|
|
|
| VF-211 | F-8E | 1XX/NP |
|
| 12-07-64 to 11-01-65 | VF-154 | F-8D | 4XX/NL | CORAL SEA | 07-18-68 to 03-03 69 | VF-24 | F-8H | 4xx;np | HANCOCK |
| CVW-16 | VMF(AW) |
|
|
|
| VF-211 | F-8H | 1XX>NP |
|
| 04-05-65 to 12-16-65 | -212 | F-8E | 1XX/WD ORISKANY |
| 08-02-69 to 04-15-70 | VF-24 | F-8H | 2Xx;np | HANCOCK |
|
| VF-162 | F-8E | 2XX/AH |
|
| VF-211 | F-8J | ixx;np |
|
| 05-26-66 to 11-16-66 | VF-111 | F-8E | 1XX/AH | ORISKANY | 10-22-70 to 06-02-71 | VF-24 | F-8J | 2XXJHP | HANCOCK |
|
| VF-162 | F-3C | 2XX/AH |
|
| VF-211 | F-8J | 1XX/NP |
|
| 06-16 67 to 01-31 68 | VF-111 | F-8C | 1XX/AH | ORISKANY | 01-07-7210 10-03-72 | VF-24 | F-8J | 2XX/NP | HANCOCK |
|
| VF-162 | F 8E | 2XX/AH |
|
| VF-211 | F-8J | 1XX/NP |
|
| 02-01-69IO09-18-69 | VF-111 | F-8H | 1XX/AH | TICONDEROGA | 05-08-73 lo 01-08-74 | VF-24 | F-8J | 2XX/NP | HANCOCK |
| - | VF-162 | F-8J | 2XX/AH |
|
| VF-211 | F-8H | 1XX/NP |
|
| MIG KILLS | |
| PILOT & SQUADRON & DATE | AIRCRAFT, WEAPON & CARRIER |
| CDR. Harold L. Marr, VF-211, 6-12-66 | F-8E/M1G-17, AIM-9, USS HANCOCK |
| LT. Eugene J. Chancy, VF-211. 6-21-66 | F-8E/MiG-17, AIM-9/20-mm, USS HANCOCK |
| LT. (JG) Phillip V. Vampaleila. VF-211, 6-21 -66 | F-8E/MiG-17, AIM-9, USS HANCOCK |
| CDR. Richard M. Bellinger, VF-162,10-9-66 | F-8E/MiG-17. AIM-9, USS ORISKANY |
| CDR. Marshall O. Wrighl, VF-211,5-1-67 | F-8E>MiG-l7, AIM-9, USS BON HOMME RICHARD |
| CDR. Paul H. Speer, VF-211, 5-19-67 | F-8E/MiG-l7, AIM-9, USS BON HOMME RICHARD |
| LT. (JG) Joseph M. Shea, VF-211, 5-19-67 | F-8E/MiG-17, AIM-9, USS BON HOMME RICHARD |
| LT. CDR. Bobby C. Lee, VF-24, 5-19-67 | F-8C/MiG-l7, AIM-9, USS BON HOMME RICHARD |
| LT. Phillip R. Wood. VF-24, 5-19-67 | F-8C/MiG-l7, AIM-9, USS BON HOMME RICHARD |
| LT. COR. Marion H. Isaacks, VF-24. 7-21-67 | F-8C/MiG-l7, AIM-9, USS BON HOMME RICHARD |
| LT. CDR. Robert L. Kirkwood, VF-24, 7-21-67 | F-8C/MiG-l7. 20-mm, USS BON HOMME RICHARD |
| LT. CDR. Ray G. Hubbard, Jr., VF-211, 7-21-67 | F-8E,'MiG-l7, Zuni/20-mm, USS BON HOMME RICHARD |
| LT. Richard E. Wyman, VF-162.12-14-67 | F-8E/MiG-17, AIM-9. USS ORISKANY |
| CDR. Lowell R. Myers, VF-51, 6-26-68 | F-8H/MIG-17, AIM-9, USS BON HOMME RICHARD |
| LT. CDR. John B. Nichols, VF-lfel, 7-9-68 | F-8E/MiG-17, AlM-9/20-mm, USS TICONDEROGA |
| CDR. Guy Cane. VF-53, 7-29-68 | F-8E.'MiG-l7, AIM-9, USS BON HOMME RICHARD |
| LT. Norman K. McCoy, Jr., VF-51, 8-1-68 | F-8H.'MiG-21, AIM-9, USS BON HOMME RICHARD |
| LT. Anthony J. Nargi, VF-111. 9-19-68 | F-8C/M1G-21, AIM-9, USS INTREPID |
| Two probables were scored: | Two probables were scored: |
| CDR. Harold L. Marr, VF-211, 6-12-66 | F-8E/MIG-17, AIM-9, USS HANCOCK |
| LT. (JG) Phil Dempewolf, VF-24, 7-21-67 | F-8C/MiG-17. AIM-9, USS BON HOMME RICHARD |
| Note: Five F-8Cs eleven F-8E's and two F-8H's got these eighteen official MiG Kills. VF-211 got 7, | |
| VF-24got4, VF-51 and VF-162 got 2 each and VF-53, VF-111 and VF-191 got 1 each. | |
| An unofficial MiG kill occured 23 may 1972 when an F-8J trom VF-211 on board the USS HANCOCK | |
| downed a MtG-17 without firing a shot. | • |
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